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Daubert Challenges to Fingerprints 
Paul C. Giannelli* 
The first reported fingerprint case, People v. Jennings/ was decided in 
1911,2 and the technique soon became finnly established in legal precedent.3 
Like many other forensic sciences, fingerprint identification gained judicial 
acceptance decades before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Daubert in 1993.4 Daubert revolutionized how 
courts decide the admissibility of scientific evidence under Federal Rule 
702, the principal provision governing the admissibility of expert testimony. 
Over time, Daubert has evolved into a far more stringent standard than many 
thought at the time the decision was handed down. 5 In 1999, the Court 
extended the Daubert reliability test to non-scientific expert testimony in 
*Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case 
Western Reserve University. This column is based in part on P. Giannelli & E. Im-
winkelried, Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 1999). Reprinted with permission. 
1 People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911). As Professor Mnookin 
has noted, "fingerprints were accepted as an evidentiary tool without a great deal of 
scrutiny or skepticism." Jennifer L. Mnookin, Finge1print Evidence in an Age of 
DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 13, 17 (2001). She elaborated: "Even if no two 
people had identical sets of fingerprints, this did not establish that no two people 
could have a single identical print, much less an identical part of a print. These are 
necessarily matters of probability, but neither the court in Jennings nor subsequent 
judges ever required that fingerprint identification be placed on a secure statistical 
foundation.'' I d. at 19. 
2 For a history of fingerprinting, see COLIN BEAVAN, FINGERPRINTS: THE ORIGINS 
OF CRIME DETECTION AND THE MURDER CASE THAT LAUNCHED FORENSIC SCIENCE 
(2001); SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITrES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND 
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (200 1 ). 
3 See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
ch. 16 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the technical and legal aspects of fingerprint 
evidence). 
4 509 U.S. 579 (1993 ). See also Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for 
Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1345, 1354 (1994) ("Considerable fo-
rensic evidence [such as fingerprinting] made its way into the courtroom without 
empirical validation of the underlying theory ancllor its particular application."); 
Michael J. Sales, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons ji-om the Law's Formative Encoun-
ters With Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1106 (1998) 
("Fingerprint evidence may present courts applying Daubert with their most 
extreme dilemma. By conventional scientific standards, any serious search for evi-
dence of the validity of fingerprint identification is going to be disappointing."). 
5 See U.S. v. Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 553, 58 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 357 (D. Md. 
2002) ("Under Daubert, ... it was expected that it would be easier to admit evi-
dence that was the product of new science or technology. In practice, however, it 
often seems as though the opposite has occuned-application of Daubert/Kumho 
Tire analysis results in the exclusion of evidence that might otherwise have been 
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Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichae/, 6 and by 2000, the Court was describing 
Daubert as imposing "exacting standards of reliability. " 7 Rule 702 was 
amended in the same year to reflect these decisions.8 
Lower courts soon began to read Daubert and Kumho as "plainly invit-
ing a reexamination even of 'generally accepted' venerable, technical 
fields.' ' 9 Handwriting analysis was the first technique to be challenged. In 
1995, a federal district court in U.S. v. Starzecpyzefl 0 concluded that "foren-
sic document examination, despite the existence of a certification program, 
professional journals and other trappings of science, cannot, after Daubert, 
be regarded as 'scientific ... knowledge."' The court further stated that 
"while scientific principles may relate to aspects of handwriting analysis, 
they have little or nothing to do with the day-to-day tasks performed by [Fo-
rensic Document Examiners]. . . . [T]his attenuated relationship does not 
transform the FDE into a scientist. "II 
It was only a matter of time before fingerprint evidence would also be 
challenged. 12 Numerous attacks, albeit unsuccessful, have since been 
launched against fingerprinting. 13 This article briefly discusses fingerprint 
admitted under Frye."). See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Revisited, 41 
CRIM. L. BuLL. 302 (2005) (describing the evolution of the Daubert test). 
6 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed. 
2d 238, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P I 5470, 50 Fed. R. Evid. 
Serv. 1373, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20638 (1999). The Court also decided a third case, 
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508, 18 
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1097, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P 15120, 48 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 
1, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. 20227, 177 A.L.R. Fed. 667 (1997) (standard for appellate 
review is abuse of discretion), to make up what is now !mown as the Daubert trilogy. 
7 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455, 120 S. Ct. 1011, 145 L. Ed. 2d 
958, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P 15745, 53 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 406,45 Fed. R. Serv. 
3d 735 (2000). 
8 The following was added to Rule 702 in December, 2000: ''(1) the testimony is 
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case.'' 
9 U.S. v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67, 52 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 257 (D. Mass. 
1999). See also U.S. v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002) ("Courts 
are now confronting challenges to testimony . . . whose admissibility had long 
been settled.''). 
10 US. v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038,42 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 247 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1995). 
II 880 F. Supp. at 1041. See generally Paul C. Giannelli & Carin Cozza, Forensic 
Science: Daubert Challenges to Handwriting Comparisons, 42 CRIM. L. BuLL. 347 
(2006) (discussing admissibility issues relating to handwriting comparison). 
12 See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 43 (" [W]hat is striking, even astonishing, is that 
no serious effort to challenge either the weight or admissibility to fingerprint evi-
dence ever emerged-untill999."). 
13 
''In the last year alone, more than a dozen so-called Daubert challenges to the 
admissibility of fingerprint identification evidence have been :filed in state and federal 
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procedure, examines several significant cases, and then considers some 
recent developments.14 
I. Fingerprint Analysis 
Fingerprint evidence is based on three assumptions: (1) The uniqueness 
of each person's friction ridges/5 (2) the permanence of those ridges 
throughout a person's life; and (3) the transferability of an impression of that 
uniqueness to another surface. It is the last point that raises the most signifi-
cant issues of reliability because only a partial impression is typically 
transferred (often only a fifth of the record print) and distortion due to pres-
sure inevitably affects the impression.16 A recent FBI review put it this way: 
[I]t is well accepted that wide variations in the amount of detail transferred 
during any given contact from the three-dimensional world of a finger to 
the two-dimensional realm of a fingerprint may not permit 
individualization. Thus, although the ridge pattern arrangement on fric-
tion ridge skin is unique, one may not be able to render an identification 
or an exclusion of a source from the limited amount of detail in certain 
latent printsP 
Thus, the "critical issue is the minimum number of objective features in a 
courts around the country. In the tlrree cases that have been decided so far, the courts 
have all admitted the fingerprint evidence. But critics say the battle isn't over yet." 
Mark Hansen, Dusting for Daubert: Several Defense Lmvyers Argue Fingerprint Ev-
idence Is Not Scientific. So far, the Courts Aren 't Buying It, 86 A.B.A.J. 20 (Dec. 
2000). 
14 This article does not address the issues raised by fraud. For articles on fraud, 
see Boris Geller et al., A Chronological Review of Fingerprint Forgery, 44 J. Fo-
RENSIC Scr. 963 (1999) (discussing history of fingerprint forge1ies); Mark Hansen, 
Troopers' Wrongdoing Taints Cases, 80 A.B.A.J. 22 (Mar. 1994) (discussing New 
York police officers' fabrication of fingerprint evidence in numerous cases). 
15 See Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & Pol'y 143, 164 (2005) 
("Although there is a substantial literature on the uniqueness of fingerprints, it is 
surprising how little true scientific support for the proposition exists.''). 
16 See U.S. v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 
U.S. 974, 125 S. Ct. 446, 160 L. Ed. 2d 348 (2004) ("Criminals generally do not 
leave behind full fingerprints on clean, fiat surfaces. Rather, they leave fragments 
that are often distorted or marred by artifacts .... Testimony at the Daubert hear-
ing suggested that the typica1latent print is a fraction-perhaps l/5th-ofthe size of 
a full fingerprint."). "In the jargon, artifacts are generally small amounts of dirt or 
grease that masquerade as parts of the ridge impressions seen in a fingerprint, while 
distortions are produced by smudging or too much pressure in making the print, 
which tends to flatten the ridges on the finger and obscure their detail." 365 F .3d at 
221 n.l. 
17 Bruce Budowle et al., Review of the Scientific Basis for Friction Ridge 
Comparisons as a Means of Identification: Committee Findings and Recommenda-
tions, 8 FoRENSIC Scr. CoMMUNICATIONS (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter FBI Review]. 
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FINGERPRINTS 
latent print necessary to render an identification with confidence. . '' 18 
This is a crucial point because a fingerprint examination, although based on 
physical characteristics, is basically subjective. 19 There is no minimum 
number of points of similarity required before a conclusion of identity may 
be reached.20 Moreover, because there are frequently "dissimilarities" be-
tween the crime scene and record prints, the examiner must decide whether 
there is a true dissimilarity, in which case there is an exclusion ("no 
match"), or whether the dissinllilarity is due to distortion or an artifact.21 
Examiners follow a procedure known as ACE-V (Analysis, Comparison, 
Evaluation, and Verification).22 Although this is a useful procedure, it is not 
"scientific" in any meaningful sense of that word.23 There are three levels of 
detail that may be scrutinized. Level 1 details are general ridge patterns-
whorls, loops, and arches.24 Level 2 features involve ridge characteristics, 
18 FBI Review, supra note 17. 
19 See Com. v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 840 N.E.2d 12, 15, 16-17 (2005) 
("These latent print impressions are almost always partial and may be distorted due 
to less than full, static contact with the object and to debris covering or altering the 
latent impression.''; ''In the evaluation stage, . . . the examiner relies on his subjec-
tive judgment to determine whether the quality and quantity of those similarities are 
sufficient to make an identification, an exclusion, or neither.''); Zabell, supra note 
15, at 158 ("In contrast to the scientifically-based statistical calculations performed 
by a forensic scientist in analyzing DNA profile frequencies, each fingerprint 
examiner renders an opinion as to the similarity of f1iction 1idge detail based on his 
subjective judgment.''). 
20 Some countries apply a minimum point standard, but the FBI does not. See 
European Fingerprint Standards, 28 FINGERPRINT WHORL 19 (2002) (reporting 
standards ranging from eight to 16 points). 
21 Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 17 ("There is a rule of examination, the 'one-
discrepancy' rule, that provides that a nonidenti:fication finding should be made if a 
single discrepancy exists. However, the examiner has the discretion to ignore a pos-
sible discrepancy if he concludes, based on his experience and the application of 
various factors, that the discrepancy might have been caused by distortions of the 
fingerprint at the time it was made or at the tinle it was collected.''). In the Mayfield 
case, the FBI examiners explained away dissimilarities, but an I.G. Report found 
that the explanation ''required the examiners to accept an extraordinary set of 
coincidences. The OIG found that the support for this explanation was, at best, 
contradictory." OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, A 
REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE, UNCLASSI-
FIED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 {Jan. 2006) [hereinafter l.G. Report]. The Mayfield 
case is discussed below. 
22 Verification involves review by a second exanliner. 
23 See Zabell, supra note 15, at 178 ("ACE-Vis an acronym, not a methodology. 
It is merely the common sense description of what anyone would do if they were 
examining a latent and a candidate source print.''). 
24 See Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 16 ("Level one detail involves the general ridge 
flow of a fingerprint, that is, the pattern of loops, arches, and whorls visible to the 
naked eye. The exanliner compares this information to the exemplar print in an at-
tempt to exclude a print that has very clear dissinlilarities.' '). 
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such as ridge endings, bifurcations, islands, and dots. 25 Level 3 details are 
''microscopic ridge attributes such as the width of a ridge, the shape of its 
edge, or the presence of a sweat pore near a particular ridge.' ' 26 There is dis-
agreement in the fingerprint community about the usefulness and reliability 
of Level 3 details. 27 
II. Fingerprint Decisions 
A. U.S. v. Havvard 
US. v. Havvard28 was the first reported case responding to a Daubert 
challenge of fingerprint evidence.29 Not only did the district court uphold the 
admissibility of fingerprint testimony, it described the technique as "the 
very archetype of reliable expert testimony under [the Daubert/Kumho] 
standards. " 30 Nevertheless, the court's application of Daubert evinced a 
surprising misunderstanding of the Supreme Court's reliability test. In Daub-
ert, the Supreme Court, in describing the trial judge's screening or "gate-
keeping function,'' identified a number of nonexhaustive factors for judging 
reliability: (1) testability, (2) peer review and publication, (3) error rate, (4) 
maintenance of standards, and (5) general acceptance. The Court also af-
finned that the burden of persuasion rests with the party offering the 
testimony. 
First, the Havvard court found that latent print identification had been 
"tested" for nearly 100 years in adversarial proceedings with the highest 
possible stakes-liberty and sometimes life. Yet, Daubert/Kumho requires 
empirical (not judicial) testing.31 The Court in Daubert held that testimony 
based on "scientific" knowledge must be scrutinized for its scientific valid-
ity: '' [I]n order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion 
must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be sup-
25 See 840 N.E.2d at 16 ("Level two details include ridge characteristics (or Gal-
ton Points) like islands, dots, and forks, formed as the ridges begin, end, join or 
bifurcate.''). 
26 See 840 N.E.2d at 16. 
27 See I.G. REPORT, supra note 21, at 8 ("Because Level3 details are so small, 
the appearance of such details in fingerprints is highly variable, even between differ-
ent fingerprints made by the same finger. As a result, the reliability ofLevel3 details 
is the subject of some controversy within the latent fingerprint community."). As 
discussed below, Level 3 features were a problem in the Mayfield case. 
28 US. v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 56 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 900 (7th Cir. 2001). 
29 Havvard was the first reported case. The first case was US. v. Mitchell, 365 
F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 974, 125 S. Ct. 446, 160 L. Ed. 2d 
348 (2004), which is discussed below. The trial court decision was not reported in 
that case. 
30 Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 855. 
31 Zabell, supra note 15, at 169 ("[I]t need hardly be said that mere courtroom 
use does not constitute validation.''). 
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ported by appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is 
known. " 32 In DNA testing, for example, validation is required.33 Moreover, 
the "argument that no latent print has ever been found to match the rolled 
print of a different person is . . . misleading because no systematic search 
for such pairs on the entire databank of millions of :fingerprints has ever been 
performed.' '34 
Next, in citing "peer review," Havvard noted that a second fingerprint 
examiner compares the prints: ''In fact, peer review is the standard operating 
procedure among latent print examiners.' ' 35 This shows a fundamental 
misconception of ''peer review'' as used in Daubert. In that case, peer 
review refers to refereed scientific journals. It is a screening mechanism and 
only the first step, followed by publication and then replication by other 
scientists. In their amici brief in Daubert, the New England Journal of 
Medicine and other medical journals explained: 
"Good science" is a commonly accepted term used to describe the scien-
tific community's system of quality control which protects the community 
and those who rely upon it from unsubstantiated scientific analysis. It 
mandates that each proposition undergo a rigorous trilogy of publication, 
replication and verification before it is relied upon.36 
Peer review's "role is to promote the publication of well-conceived articles 
so that the most important review, the consideration of the reported results 
by the scientific community, may occur after publication.' ' 37 The brief 
elaborated: "Good science requires that a proposition be supported by ex-
perimental data, be reduced to writing, and be published after undergoing 
peer-review prior to any reliance thereon.' ' 38 In contrast, review by a second 
expert is simply a quality control procedure, albeit an important one. 39 
32 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
33 See DNA ADVISORY BOARD, STANDARD 2 (:ff) (1998) ("Validation is a process 
by which a procedure is evaluated to determine its efficacy and reliability for foren-
sic casework analysis and includes: (1) Developmental validation is the acquisition 
of test data and determination of conditions and linlltations of a new or novel DNA 
methodology for use on forensic samples; (2) Internal validation is an accumulation 
of test data within the laboratory to demonstrate that established methods and · 
procedures perform as expected in the laboratory."). 
34 Zabell, supra note 15, at 170. 
35 Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854. 
36 Brief of the New England Journal of Medicine, Journal of the American Medi-
cal Association, and Annals of Internal Medicine as Amici Curiae in Support of Re-
spondent at 2, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. 
Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1200, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P 13494, 
37 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. l, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 20979 (1993) [hereinafter Brief]. 
37 Brief, supra note 36, at 3. 
38 Brief, supra note 36, at 3. 
39 In the DNA context, it is referred to as "technical review." See DNA ADvi-
SORY BoARD, STANDARD 12 (1998) (administrative and technical review of all case 
files). 
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Furthermore, this review is often not ''blind,'' a fact that proved critical in 
the Mayfield case, as discussed below. 
Next, the Havvard court accepted the prosecution expert's statement 
that the ''error rate for the method is zero,' ' 40 a remarkable claim. Not know-
ing an error rate, of course, is not the same as a zero error rate. Moreover, 
proficiency tests showing the fallibility of fingerprint examiners had been 
reported. For instance, in a 1995 proficiency test, produced by the Interna-
tional Association for Identification, only 68 of 156 participants (44%) were 
correct in classifying the seven latent prints used in the test. Forty-eight 
incorrect identifications were made.41 Note, however, the word method in the 
above quotation. Proponents argue that, while individual examiners may 
make mistakes, the method itself is perfect. However, the dichotomy be-
tween "methodological" and "human" error rates in this context is "practi-
cally meaningless' '42 because the examiner is the method. 43 
Finally, the court turned Daubert on its head, requiring the opponent to 
prove the evidence was unreliable, a device that would be employed in later 
cases.44 
B. U.S. v Llera Plaza 
The most electrifying fingerprint case was US. v. Llera Plaza,45 which 
held that a fingerprint expert could not give an opinion that two sets of prints 
''matched' '-that is, a positive identification to the exclusion of all other 
persons.46 On rehearing, however, the court reversed itself.47 These opinions, 
40 Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854. 
41 See David Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J. FoRENSIC IDENTIFICATION 521, 
523 (1996). See also James E. StarTs, Forensic Science on the Ropes: An Upper Cut 
to Finge1printing, 20 Scl. SLEUTHING REv. 1 (Wint. 1996). 
42 See Mnoolcin, supra note 1, at 60. She goes on to provide this analogy: "The 
same argument could be made of eyewitness testimony, a notoriously unreliable 
form of evidence. People are all distinct from one another in observable ways; 
therefore the theoretical error rate of eyewitness identification is zero, though in 
practice observers may frequently make errors.'' !d. See also Simon A. Cole, More 
Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Finge1print Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1040 (2005) (explaining that "in fingerprint practice the 
concept is vacuous"). 
43 See Zabell, supra note 15, at 172 ("But, given its unavoidable subjective 
component, in latent print examination people are the process."). 
44 See Michael J. Sales, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science 
(Especially Finge1print Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 1167, 1173-76 
(2003) (discussing the reversal ofthe burden of persuasion as one of several judicial 
responses employed to avoid confronting the lack of empirical testing). 
45 U.S. v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 57 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 983 (E.D. Pa. 
2002), withdrawn from bound volume and opinion vacated and superseded on 
reconsideration, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 58 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
46 See D.H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-
Plaza, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 1073, 1073 (2003) ("The ruling sent shock waves 
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however, triggered a series of news reports48 and legal articles, 49 with many 
commentators believing that Llera Plaza I was more faithful to Daubert than 
Llera Plaza II. 5° Consequently, fingerprinting would no longer get a free 
pass-at least in the legal literature. 
Even Llera Plaza II was not a total victory for the prosecution. The rigor 
of proficiency testing was drawn into question because a fingerprint examiner 
from New Scotland Yard testified that the FBI proficiency tests were 
deficient: "It's not testing their ability. It doesn't test their expertise. I mean 
I've set these tests to trainees and advanced technicians. And ifl gave my 
through the col1Ul1unity of fingerprint analysts, the FBI, and the Department of 
Justice.''). 
47 Two factors led Judge Pollak to reconsider his ruling. One was expert 
testimony-some elicited from defense witnesses-indicating that, like the FBI, 
New Scotland Yard had moved to a non-numerical standard. A second factor was 
the judge's review of other, recent federal cases upholding the admission of non-
scientific expert opinions despite their subjectivity. In the end, on the record before 
him, Judge Pollak concluded that 
there is no evidence that certified FBI fingerprint examiners present erroneous 
identification testimony, and ... there is no evidence that the rate of error of 
certified FBI fingerprint examiners is unacceptably high. With those findings in 
mind, I am not persuaded that courts should defer admission of testimony with 
respect to fingerprinting . . . until academic investigators financed by the 
National Institute of Justice have made substantial headway on a "verification 
and validation" research agenda. For the National Institute of Justice, or other 
institutions both public and private, to sponsor such research would be all to the 
good. But to postpone present in-court utilization of this ''bedrock forensic 
identifier" pending such research would be to make the best the enemy of the 
good. 
Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp.2d at 572. 
48 E.g., Michael Specter, Do Fingerprints Lie? The Gold Standard of Forensic 
Science is Now Being Challenged, NEW YoRKER, May 27, 2002, at 96 (discussing 
case including interview with judge). 
49 See Simon A Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rul-
ings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CR1M. L. REv. 1189 
(2004); Kristin Romandetti, Note, Recognizing and Responding to a Problem with 
the Admissibility of Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 45 JUR1METR1CS J. 41 
(2004); Tara Marie La Marte, Col1Ul1ent, Sleeping Gatekeepers: United States v. 
Llera Plaza and the Unreliability of Forensic Fingerprinting Evidence Under Daub-
ert, 14 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 171 (2003); Jessica M. Sombat, Note, Latent Justice: 
Daubert's Impact on the Evaluation of Fingerprint Identification Testimony, 70 
FoRDHAM L. REv. 2819 (2002); Nathan Benedict, Note, Fingerprints and the Daub-
ert Standard for Admission of Scientific Evidence: Why Finge1prints Fail and a 
Proposed Remedy, 46 ARiz. L. REv. 519 (2004). 
50 E.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, 20 IssuEs IN 
Sci. & TEcH. 47 (2003) ("Judge Pollak's first opinion [restricting latent fingerprint 
individualization testimony] was the better one."); Sombat, supra note 49, at 2825 
("[T]he result Judge Pollak reached when he excluded expert testimony concerning 
fingerprints [in Llera Plaza 1] was fair."); Recent Case, 115 HARv. L. REv. 2349, 
2352 (2002) ("Fingerprint expert testimony does not survive application of the 
Daubert factors. . . . "). 
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experts these tests, they'd fall about laughing. " 51 The district court agreed, 
noting that ''the FBI examiners got very high proficiency grades, but the 
tests they took did not. ... [O]n the present record I conclude that the profi-
ciency tests are less demanding than they should be.' ' 52 A later FBI report on 
the Mayfield case would acknowledge this shortcoming, 53 as would others. 54 
C. U.S. v. Crisp 
In United States v. Crisp, 55 the majority opinion again upheld the admis-
sibility of fingerprint evidence, but it did so by shifting the burden of proof 
to the defendant and by grandfathering the technique. 56 
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Michael took a different approach, 
stringently applying the Daubert factors. First, he noted that the "govern-
ment did not offer any record of testing on the reliability of fingerprint 
identification. . . . [T]here have not been any studies to establish how likely 
it is that partial prints taken from a crime scene will be a match for only one 
set of fingerprints in the world.' ' 57 Second, as for peer review, '' [a ]gain, the 
government offered no evidence on this factor at trial. Fingerprint examiners 
. . .. have their own professional publications. . . . But unlike typical scien-
tific journals, the fingerprint publications do not run articles that include or 
prompt critique or reanalysis by other scientists. Indeed, few of the articles 
51 Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 558. 
52 188 F. Supp. 2d at 565. 
53 See infra text accompanying note 83. 
54 See U.S. v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 274, 60 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1486 (4th Cir. 
2003) (Michael, J., dissenting) ("Proficiency testing is typically based on a study of 
prints that are far superior to those usually retrieved from a crime scene.''); Jennifer 
L. Mnoolcin, Editorial, A Blow to the Credibility of Fingerprint Evidence, BosTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2004 (''There are no systematic proficiency tests to evaluate examin-
ers' skill. Those tests that exist are not routinely used and are substandard."). 
55 US. v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 60 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1486 (4th Cir. 2003). Other 
cases admitting fingerprint evidence include: U.S. v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307, 
67 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 17 (11th Cir. 2005) ("We agree with the decisions of our 
sister circuits and hold that the fingerprint evidence admitted in this case satisfied 
Daubert."); U.S. v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 690, 65 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 834 (8th Cir. 
2004) (finding fingerprint evidence to be reliable); U.S. v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 
682, 62 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 223 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Fingerprint evidence and analysis 
is generally accepted."); U.S. v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2002); U.S. 
v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20, 56 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 878 (D.P.R. 
2001). 
56 Crisp, 324 F.3d at 269 ("Put simply, Crisp has provided us no reason today to 
believe that this general acceptance of the principles underlying fingerprint 
identification has, for decades, been misplaced. Accordingly, the district court was 
well within its discretion in accepting at face value the consensus of the expert and 
judicial communities that the fingerprint identification technique is reliable."). 
57 324 F.3d at 273-74 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
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address the principles of fingerprint analysis and identification at all. . '' 58 
Third, "an error rate must be demonstrated by reliable scientific studies, not 
by assumption. " 59 Fourth, "the government did not establish that there are 
objective standards in the fingerprint examination field to guide examiners in 
making their comparisons.' ' 6° Fifth, while acknowledging general accep-
tance in the fingerprint community, the judge observed that this was not suf-
ficient for Daubert purposes, remarking that " [ n ]othing in the record in this 
case shows that the fingerprint examination community has challenged itself 
sufficiently or has been challenged in any real sense by outside scientists." 61 
While only a dissent, the opinion indicates that the reliability of fingerprint 
evidence was no longer being taken for granted. 
D. U.S. v. Mitchell 
U.S. v. Mitchell, 62 which involved the first post-Daubert attack on 
fingerprint evidence, also upheld admissibility. The court reached this 
conclusion by finding a ''long history of implicit testing.' ' 63 This seems to be 
the "adversarial testing" argument accepted in Havvard, only in different 
words, and it suffers from the same defect; it is not empirical testing.64 The 
court also used a burden-shifting rationale to cast the onus on the defense to 
establish false positives. 65 Yet, Daubert placed the burden on the party offer-
58 324 F.3d at 274. 
59 324 F.3d at 274. The judge added: "In a 1995 test conducted by a commercial 
testing service, less than half of the fingerprint examiners were able to identify cor-
rectly all of the matches and eliminate the non-matches. On a similar test in 1998, 
less than 60 percent of the examiners were able to make all identifications and 
eliminations. . . . An error rate that runs remarkably close to chance can hardly be 
viewed as acceptable under Daubert.'' 324 F.3d at 275. 
60 324 F.3d at 276. 
61 324 F.3d at 276. 
62 U.S. v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 974, 125 
S. Ct. 446, 160 L. Ed. 2d 348 (2004). See also Simon A. Cole, Does "Yes" Really 
Mean Yes? The Attempt to Close Debate on the Admissibility of Fingerprint Testi-
mony, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 449,464 (2005) ("The [court's] reliance on the failure of 
AFIS searches to find false positives when, in fact, they could not do so and the as-
sumption that the defendant was the source of the very prints at issue in the admis-
sibility hearing at his own trial undermine the persuasiveness of the [Mitchell] 
opinion."). 
63 Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 238. The Court did, however, acknowledge: "[I]f 
directed, specific actual testing were the requirement of Daubert, we might be hesi-
tant to find this factor weighing in favor of the government." 365 F.3d at 238. 
64 See Simon A. Cole, "Implicit Testing": Can Casework Validate Forensic 
Techniques?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 117, 128 (2006) ("But whatever the courts' intui-
tive confidence in latent-print individualization, 'implicit testing' and 'casework 
validation' set poor precedents that defy science and logic.''). 
65 Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 240 ("Particularly in a case like this, where what is sought 
to be proved is essentially a negative (i.e., the absence of false positives), it seems 
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ing the evidence, which is the typical evidentimy rule. 66 Moreover, as one 
British scholar has argued: "To put the point more bluntly: if the state does 
not test the scientific evidence with which it seeks to convict defendants, it 
should forfeit the right to use it.' ' 67 The court, however, did offer some cau-
tion: 
[D]istrict courts will generally act within their discretion in excluding 
testimony of recalcitrant expert witnesses-those who will not discuss on 
cross-examination things like error rates or the relative subjectivity or 
objectivity of their methods. Testimony at the Daubert hearing indicated 
that some latent fingerprint examiners insist that there is no error rate as-
sociated with their activities or that the examination process is irreducibly 
subjective. This would be out-of-place under Rule 702.68 
In addition, the case involved a very troubling episode. In March 2000, 
the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the research arm of the Department of 
Justice, released a solicitation for fingerprint research. The "Introduction" 
to the solicitation stated that Daubert "require[ d) scientists to address the 
reliability and validity of the methods used in their analysis. Therefore, the 
purpose of this solicitation is to ... provide greater scientific foundation for 
forensic friction ridge (fingerprint) identification.' '69 After the Mitchell trial 
concluded, the defense attorney learned that the solicitation had been 
postponed, arguably so it could not be used in Mitchell to support the defense 
challenge.70 The Third Circuit commented on these events: "We are deeply 
discomforted by Mitchell's contention-supported by Dr. Rau's account of 
events, though contradicted by other witnesses-that a conspiracy within the 
Department of Justice intentionally delayed the release of the solicitation 
until after Mitchell's jury reached a verdict. Dr. Rau's stoP;, if true, would 
be a damning indictment of the ethics of those involved. " 71 Dr. Rau was the 
quite appropriate to us to use a burden-shifting framework. Such a framework was 
applied here: The government's experts ... testified to their being unaware of sig-
nificant false positive identifications. At that point, it becomes quite reasonable to 
shift the burden to the opponent of the evidence (here, Mitchell) to counter this 
claim with affirmative examples.''). 
66 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 n.l 0 ("These matters should be established by a 
preponderance of proof.") (citing Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171, 175-76, 107 S. 
Ct. 2775,97 L. Ed. 2d 144,22 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1105 (1987)). 
67 MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 139 (2001). 
68 Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 245-46. 
69 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, SOLICITATION: FORENSIC FRICTION RIDGE 
(FINGERPRINT) EXAMINATION VALIDATION STUDIES (Mar. 2000). 
70 See Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint ''Sci-
ence" Is Revealed, 75 So. CAL. L. REv. 605, 628 n.122 (2002) ("Internal docu-
ments of the NIJ presently on file with the author . . . reveal that the Institute was 
ready to publish the Solicitation in September of 1999, but that at the FBI's request, 
publication was delayed until after Mitchell's trial."). Epstein was the defense 
counsel in Mitchell. 
71 Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 255. In another passage, the Court wrote: 
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NIJ official who coordinated the drafting of the solicitation for the Depart-
ment of Justice. 72 
Moreover, a subsequent attempt to establish an empirical basis for 
fingerprints was thwarted. An editorial in the prestigious scientific journal, 
Science, entitled "Forensic Science: Oxymoron?" and written by the editor-
in-chief, discussed the cancellation of a National Academy of Sciences proj-
ect designed to examine various forensic science techniques, including 
fingerprints, because the Departments of Justice and Defense insisted on a 
right of review that the Academy had refused to other grant sponsors.73 In 
sum, not only is there a lack of empirical support for fingerprint evidence, 74 
but the proponents of the technique are undercutting efforts to establish such 
a basis. 
Ill. The Mayfield Case 
The terrorist train bombing in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which killed 
191 and injured 2,000, exploded the myth of fingerprint infallibility more 
than any other event The FBI misidentified Brandon Mayfield, a Portland 
lawyer, as the source of the crime scene prints.75 
To its credit, the FBI began an investigation using outside experts. The 
[Mitchell's] most damaging evidence came from Dr. Richard Rau of the NIJ, 
who coordinated the drafting of the solicitation. Rau testified to conversations at 
a September 1999 meeting among himself, Donald Kerr (the Assistant Director 
of the FBI in charge of the FBI crime laboratory), David Boyd (the Deputy 
Director of the NIJ), and others. Rau claimed that at that meeting Kerr and Boyd 
agreed to withhold release of the solicitation until the end ofMitchell's trial. In 
response to Dr. Rau's testimony, the government called Kerr, Boyd, and the 
other individuals at the meeting to testify that Dr. Rau's account of the delay in 
releasing the solicitation was incorrect and that the delay was caused by budget-
ary issues. 
365 F.3d at 232. 
72 The district court did not resolve the credibility issue because it found that this 
information was not ''material'' under the stringent standard required by Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)-i.e., outcome 
determinative. The Third Circuit agreed. 365 F.3d at 219. 
73 Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Forensic Science: Oxymoron?, 302 Sci. 1625 
(2003). 
74 See Donald Kennedy & Richard A. Merrill, Assessing Forensic Science, 20 Is-
SUES IN Sci. & TECH. 33 (Fall 2003) ("The increased use of DNA analysis, which 
has undergone extensive validation, has thrown into relief the less firmly credentialed 
status of other forensic science identification techniques (fingerprints, fiber analysis, 
hair analysis, ballistics, bite marks, and tool marks). These have not undergone the 
type of extensive testing and verification that is the hallmark of science elsewhere. 
These techniques rely on the skill of the examiner, but since the practitioners have 
not been subjected to rigorous proficiency testing reliable error rates are not 
known.''). 
75 See Sara Kershaw, Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2004, at AI (Spanish authorities cleared Brandon Mayfield and 
matched the fingerprints to an Algerian national); Flynn McRoberts & Maurice Pos-
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resulting report raised a number of disquieting issues. 76 First, the ''dis-
similarities [between prints] ... were easily observed when a detailed anal-
ysis of the latent print was conducted.' ' 77 In short, it was not a difficult 
fingerprint to interpret. Second, the mistake was attributed in part to 
"confirmation bias" 78 -a well-established phenomenon that is frequently 
ignored in forensic work.79 In other words, once the examiner made up his 
mind, he saw what he expected to see during reexaminations. Third, a second 
review by another examiner was not conducted blind-i.e., the reviewer 
knew that a positive identification had already been made.80 Again, confirma-
tion bias. 81 Fourth, the culture at the laboratory was poorly suited to detect 
mistakes. As the report noted, ''To disagree was not an expected response.' ' 82 
Fifth, proficiency testing was apparently not sufficiently rigorous.83 Surpris-
ingly, the report repeatedly alluded to the need to be cautious due to the 
''inherent pressure of a high-profile case,' '84 leaving one to wonder about the 
routine case. 
sley, Report Blasts FBI Lab: Peer Pressure Led to False JD of Madrid Fingerprint, 
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 2004, at l. The FBI found 15 "matching" points, while the 
Spanish examiners found only seven. 
76 Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Finge1print Individualization in 
the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 707 (2004) [here-
inafter Mayfield Report]. This is not to say that the report is not without problems. 
The report continued to employ the dichotomy between "methodological" and 
"human" error. Id. at 712. 
77 Mayfield Report, supra note 76, at 714. 
78 Mayfield Report, supra note 76, at 713. 
79 See D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer 
Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 39 (2002). 
80 Mayfield Report, supra note 76, at 711. Indeed, a third expert from outside the 
FBI, one appointed by the court, also confirmed the identification. 
81 Given this finding, the following statement in the report is puzzling: ''Latent 
print examiners routinely conduct verifications in which they do lmow the previous 
examiner's conclusions and yet those results do not influence the examiner's 
conclusions." Mayfield Report, supra note 76, at 713. No support is cited for this 
conclusion. The report goes on to recommend "blind verification" on "designated 
cases." Id. at 715. Why not all cases? Finally, the report notes: "The quality assur-
ance program should make examiners feel that they can disagree about any 
identification." I d. This statement has been criticized. "The verifiers should not 
'feel that they can disagree' because there should be nothing for them to either agree 
or disagree about." Zabell, supra note 15, at 174. In short, the testing should be 
blind, in which case the reviewers would not be subject to confirmation bias. 
82 Mayfield Report, supra note 76, at 713. 
83 Mayfield Report, supra note 76, at 716 ("Verifiers should be given challenging 
exclusions during blind proficiency tests to ensure that they are independently ap-
plying ACE-V methodology correctly. . . . ''). 
84 Mayfield Report, supra note 76, at 713 & 716. The I.G. Report, however, 
"found no evidence to support this conclusion." See I.G. REPORT, supra note 21, at 
11. 
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The Inspector General (LG.) also reviewed the Mayfield case. 85 Among 
other things,86 the LG. Report concluded that "the examiners committed er-
rors in the examination procedure, and that the misidentification could have 
been prevented through a more rigorous application of several principles of 
latent fingerprint identification.' ' 87 In addition, a significant cause of the mis-
identification was ''reasoning 'backward' from features that were visible in 
the known prints of Mayfield. " 88 As the Report explained: "Having found 
as many as 10 points of unusual similarity, the FBI examiners began to 'find' 
additional features in LFP 17 that were not really there, but rather were sug-
gested to the examiners by features in the Mayfield prints. " 89 After noting 
the controversy among examiners about Level 3 details, the report concluded 
that the examiners "apparently misinterpreted distortions in [the print] as 
real features corresponding to Level 3 details seen in Mayfield's known 
fingerprints.' ' 90 Moreover, the FBI Lab ignored the possibility that it had 
erred: "FBI examiners did not attempt to detennine the basis of the [Spanish 
National Police's] doubts before reiterating that they were 'absolutely 
confident' in the identification on Apri115, a full week before the FBI Labo-
ratory met with the SNP."91 The I.G. made several recommendations that 
went beyond the Bureau's internal report: 
These include recommendations that the Laboratory [I] develop criteria 
for the use of Level 3 details to support identifications, [2] clarify the "one 
discrepancy rule" to assure that it is applied in a manner consistent with 
the level of certainty claimed for latent fingerprint identifications, [3] 
require documentation of features observed in the latent fingerprint 
before the comparison phase to help prevent circular reasoning, [4] adopt 
alternate procedures for blind verifications, [5] review prior cases in 
which the identification of a criminal suspect was made on the basis of 
only one latent fingerprint searched through IAFIS, and [6] require more 
meaningful and independent documentation of the causes of errors as 
part of the Laboratory's corrective action procedures.92 
IV. Other Misidentifications 
Mayfield was not the only fingerprint mishap recently reported. Stephan 
85 See I.G. REPORT, supra note 21. 
86 The I.G. Report also highlighted the lack of blind verification: "[U]nder 
procedures in place at ilie time of the Mayfield identification, the verifier was aware 
iliat an identification had already been made by a p1ior FBI examiner at the time he 
was requested to conduct ilie verification." I. G. REPORT, supra note 21, at 10-11. 
87 I.G. REPORT, supra note 21, at 6. 
88 I.G. REPORT, supra note 21, at 7. 
89 I.G. REPORT, supra note 21, at 7. 
90 I.G. REPORT, supra note 21, at 8 ("Because Level 3 details are so small, the 
appearance of such details in fingerprints is highly variable, even between different 
fingerprints made by ilie same finger. As a result, the reliability of Level 3 details is 
the subject of some controversy within the latent fingerprint community.''). 
91 I.G. REPORT, supra note 21, at 10. 
92 I.G. REPORT, supra note 21, at 14. 
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Cowans was released after serving six years in a Massachusetts prison for 
the nonfatal shooting of a police officer. 93 His was the first conviction 
overturned on DNA evidence in which fingerprint evidence had been crucial 
in securing the wrongful conviction. 94 Commenting on the case, Professor 
Mnookin wrote: '' [T]he fingerprint community has little motivation to 
investigate how often they make mistakes. Fingerprint examiners regularly 
assert in court that the technique is error-free and that fingerprint matches are 
a sure thing .... [F]ingerprints cannot possibly be as perfect a technique as 
the experts presently claim.' ' 95 
Riki Jackson's prints were similarly misidentified.96 He was convicted of 
murder in 1997 based on bloody fingerprints discovered on a window fan.97 
The police expert, Anthony Paparo, matched 11 friction points to Jackson. 
Another examiner concurred. At trial, Paparo and two other prosecution 
experts testified to a match. In contrast, two defense experts, both retired FBI 
examiners, said that there was no match. Nevertheless, Jackson was 
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Frustrated, the defense experts 
filed a complaint with the International Association ofldentification concern-
ing the prosecution experts' testimony. This triggered an FBI review, which 
concluded that the government experts had erred. Jackson was released from 
prison.98 
Professor Cole has identified 22 misidentifications, which he argues ''are 
most likely only the tip of the proverbial iceberg of actual cases of fingerprint 
misattribution.' ' 99 The misidentification cases include some that involved (1) 
verification by one or more other examiners, (2) examiners certified by the 
International Association ofidentification, (3) procedures using a 16-point 
93 See Com. v. Cowans, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 756 N.E.2d 622 (2001) (uphold-
ing original conviction). 
94 See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Simon A. Cole, Letter, Contaminated Evidence, 304 
Scr. 959 (May 7, 2004) ("[F]orensic scientists remain stubbornly unwilling to 
confront and control the problem of bias, insisting that it can be overcome through 
sheer force of will and good intentions.''). 
95 Jennifer L. Mnookin, Editorial, A Blow to the Credibility of Fingerprint Evi-
dence, BosTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2004. 
96 See Reasonable Doubt: Can We Trust Crime Labs?, CNN PRESENTS, Jan. 9, 
2005 (documentary). 
97 Flynn McRoberts et al., Forensics Under the Microscope: Unproven Tech-
niques Sway Courts, Erode Justice, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 2004. 
98 Other problematic fingerprint cases include: Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 
795 (C. D. Cal. 1969), judgment aff d, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970) (expert failed to 
observe an exculpatory fingerprint in a murder case in which the death penalty was 
imposed); State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 (Minn. 1982) (holding modified 
by, Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. 2002)) ("The fingerprint expert's 
testimony was damning-and it was false.''). See also Specter, supra note 48, at 96; 
James E. Starrs, A Miscue in Finge1print Identification: Causes and Concerns, 12 J. 
POLICE Scr. & ADMIN. 287 (1984). 
99 Cole, supra note 42, at 991. The Mayfield, Cowans, and Jackson cases are 
included in his survey. 
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standard, and (4) defense experts who corroborated misidentifications made 
by prosecution experts. 
V. The "Experiment" 
As a result of the Mayfield case, several British researchers devised a 
plan to test whether external influences can affect the identification process.100 
In particular, they were concerned with confirmation bias as occurred in the 
Mayfield misidentification. Fingerprint examiners who were unfamiliar with 
the Mayfield prints were asked by colleagues to compare a crime scene and 
suspect print. "They were told that the pair of prints was the one that was er-
roneously matched by the FBI as the Madrid bomber, thus creating an 
extraneous context that the prints were a non-match. " 101 The participants 
were then instructed to ignore this information. The prints, in fact, were 
from cases that each of the participants had previously matched. Of the five 
examiners, only one still judged the print to be a match. The other four 
changed their opinions; three directly contradicted their prior identifications, 
and the fourth concluded that there was insufficient data to reach a definite 
conclusion. ''This is striking given that all five experts had seen the identical 
fingerprints previously and all had decided that the prints were a sound and 
definite match. " 102 The authors ofthe study concluded: 
Our study shows that it is possible to alter identification decisions on the 
same fingerprint, solely by presenting it in a different context. This does 
not imply that fingerprint and other forensic identifications are not a sci-
ence, but it does highlight problems of subjectivity, interpretation, and 
other psychological and cognitive elements that interact and may distort 
any scientific inquiries.103 
VI. Simultaneous Impressions 
In Commonwealth v. Patterson, 104 the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts considered the reliability of applying the ACE-V methodology to 
simultaneous impressions. Simultaneous impressions "are two or more fric-
tion ridge impressions from the fingers and/or palm on one hand that are 
determined to have been deposited at the same time.' ' 105 The key, of course, 
is determining whether the impressions were left at the same time and thus 
100 Itiel E. Dror .et el., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to 
Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FoRENSIC Sci. INT'L 74 (2006). 
101 Dror et el., supra note 100, at 76. 
102 Dror et el., supra note 100, at 76. 
103 Dror et el., supra note 100, at 77. 
104 Com. v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 840 N.E.2d 12 (2005). See also The Reli-
ability of Latent Print Individualization: Brief of Amici Curiae Submitted on behalf 
of Scientists and Scholars by the New England Innocence Project, Commonwealth 
v. Patterson, reprinted in 42 CRIM. L. BuLL. 21 (2006). 
105 FBI Review, supra note 17. 
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came from the same person, rather than having been left by two different 
people at different times. 106 While the court found that the ACE-V method 
was generally accepted by the relevant scientific community, the same was 
not demonstrated in the record when that methodology is applied to simulta-
neous impressions. The court thus remanded the case to the trial court.107 
A FBI review addressed this subject: "[I]fan item could only be held in 
a certain manner, then the only way of explaining the evidence is that the 
multiple prints are from a single person. In some cases, identifying simulta-
neous prints may infer, for example, the manner in which a lmife was 
held. " 108 However, the review found that there wasn't even agreement on 
what constitutes a "simultaneous impression," and therefore, more explicit 
guidelines were needed. 
VII. FBI Review 
In January 2006, the FBI created a three-person review committee to 
evaluate the ''fundamental basis for the science of friction ridge skin impres-
sion pattem analysis. " 109 The Conunittee identified two possible approaches. 
One approach would be to "develop a quantifiable minimum threshold based 
106 Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 18 ("[T]he examiner apparently may take into ac-
count the distance separating the latent impressions, the orientation of the impres-
sions, the pressure used to make the impression, and any other facts the examiner 
deems relevant. The record does not, however, indicate that there is any approved 
standardized method for making the determination that two or more print impres-
sions have been made simultaneously.''). 
107 The court wrote: 
Evidence of fingerprint individualization determined by application of the 
ACE-V method to single latent fingerprint impressions meets the Lanigan-
Daubert reliability standard. The general acceptance of this application of 
ACE-V by the fingerprint examiner community leads us to this conclusion. 
However, the application of ACE-V to simultaneous impressions cannot rely on 
the more usual application of ACE-V for its admissibility, but must be indepen-
dently tested against the Lanigan-Daubert standard. On the record before the 
motion judge, the Commonwealth has not yet established that the application of 
the ACE-V method to simultaneous impressions is generally accepted by the 
fingerprint examiner community or that a review of the other Daubert factors 
favors admission of evidence based on such an application. Consequently, we 
vacate the judge's supplemental order and remand the case for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
840 N.E.2d. at 32-33. 
108 FBI Review, supra note 17. 
109 FBI Review, supra note 17. One might quibble with the committee's mission 
statement. Determining whether fingerprint identification is a "science" might have 
been stated as the "mission," rather than simply assuming that it is. But see Cole, 
supra note 62, at 463 ("[D]ebating the scientific status of fingerprinting is not very 
productive. 'Science' is notoriously difficult to define. Moreover, showing that 
fingerprint evidence is not 'science' changes nothing since even nonscientific experts 
are permitted to testify."). However, if jurors come to trial with a belief that 
fingerprint identification is a "science," the debate becomes important. 
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FINGERPRINTS 
on objective criteria'' -if possible. ''Any minimum threshold must consider 
both the clarity (quality) and the quantity offeatures and include all levels of 
detail, not simply points or minutiae." 110 Appare1itly, FBI examiners use an 
unofficial seven-point cutoff, but this standard has never been tested.m As 
the review cautioned: "It is compelling to focus on a quantifiable threshold; 
however, quality/clarity, i.e., distortion and degradation of prints, is the 
fundamental issue that needs to be addressed." 112 
The second approach would treat the examiner as a "black box," a 
methodology that would be necessary if minimum criteria for rendering an 
identification could not be devised. In other words, there is simply too much 
subjectivity in the process to fommlate meaningful guidelines. Under this 
approach, it becomes critical to detem1ine just how good a ''black box'' 
each examiner is: "The examiner(s) can be tested with various inputs of a 
range of defined categories of prints. This approach would demonstrate 
whether or not it is possible to obtain a degree of accuracy (i.e., assess the 
performance of the black-box examiner for rendering an identification). "Il3 
This approach also calls for a blind technical review. According to the report, 
"[t]o be truly blind, the second examiner should have no knowledge of the 
interpretation by the first examiner (to include not seeing notes or 
repmis). " 114 
Although this review concluded that reliable identifications can be made, 
it conceded that ''there are scientific areas where improvements in the 
practice can be made particularly regarding validation, more objective 
criteria for certain aspects of the ACE-V process, and data collection. " 115 
Conclusion 
The basic problem with fingerprint identification is the lack of empirical 
testing, something that has been recognized by both courts116 and 
no FBI Review, supra note 17. 
m There is also a 12-point cutoff, under which a supervisor's approval is required. 
n 2 FBI Review, supra note 17. 
na FBI Review, supra note I 7. 
n 4 FBI Review, supra note I 7. 
n 5 FBI Review, supra note I 7. 
us See U.S. v. Crisp, 324 F. 3d 261, 273-74, 60 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. I486 (4th Cir. 
2003) (Michael, J., dissenting) ("The govemment did not offer any record of testing 
on the reliability of fingerprint identification. . . . Indeed it appears that there has 
not been sufficient critical testing to determine the scientific validity of the technique. 
. . . The government did not introduce studies or testing that would show that 
fingerprint identification is based on reliable principles of methods."); U.S. v. Sulli-
van, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003) ("The reliability of ACE-Vis not 
demonstrated by its use in prior court cases. The court further finds that, while the 
ACE-V methodology appears to be amenable to testing, such testing has not yet 
been performed. The court disagrees that testing that establishes the validity of the 
principles underlying ACE-V-that fingerprints are unique and permanent-can 
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commentators.117 One prominent scientist summed it up this way: "It's not 
that fingerprint analysis is unreliable [but] . . . that its reliability is unveri-
fied by either statistical models of fingerprint variation or by consistent data 
on error rates. " 118 Courts have also failed to provide effective scrutiny: 
''Overall, what is most striking about the judicial response to the challenges 
of fingerprinting is a general reluctance to admit that assessing fingerprinting 
under Daubert raises tricky issues." 119 
The most disappointing aspect of the controversy has been the reaction 
of fingerprint examiners. Instead of conducting the necessary empirical test-
ing, they have generally "circled the wagons" and vigorously opposed test-
ing (even by others)-at least until the Mayfield fiasco. Had the fingerprint 
community commenced the research a decade ago when Daubert challenges 
became inevitable, that research would be complete by now, and courts 
would have a principled basis for deciding the reliability issue. 
substitute for testing of the ACE-V methodology itself."). See also State v. Quin-
tana, 2004 UT App 418, 103 P.3d 168, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 123 
P.3d 815 (Utah 2005) (Thorne, J., concurring) ("Specifically, we should instruct our 
juries that although there may be a scientific basis to believe that fingerprints are 
unique, there is no similar basis to believe that examiners are infallible. . . . Until 
there is a nationally adopted certification system-ensuring examiner proficiency-
and a nationally adopted minimum standard for matching latent fingerprints to 
known samples-minimizing the risk of misidentification-courts should ensure 
that juries are instructed that examiner testimony is informed opinion, but not 
fact."). 
117 See Benedict, supra note 49, at 538 ("[J]udges have generally relied on their 
instincts and the long history of judicial acceptance of fingerprint evidence to admit 
it without serious consideration of the science behind it."); Cole, supra note 49, at 
1215 ("It is clear that no studies exist that measure the accuracy of fingerprint 
examiners when they make conclusions of identification.''); Lyn Haber & Ralph 
Norman Haber, Error Rates for Human Fingerprint Examiners, in AuTOMATIC 
FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 339 (N.K. Ratha & Ruud Bolle eds., 2004) 
(After nearly a century of practice, no properly designed, controlled, and conducted 
study of the accuracy of latent print individualizations exists.). 
118 Kennedy, supra note 73, at 1625. See also Zabell, supra note 15, at 178 ("The 
problem is that we have no tme idea of the underlying error rate."). 
119 Mnookin, supra note 1, at 66. 
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